Imam Reza (as) On Divine Unity-part 2

Imam Reza (as) states in his sermon on Divine Unity:
”فَلَيْسَ اللَّهُ [اللَّهَ] مَنْ عَرَفَ بِالتَّشْبِيهِ ذَاتَهُ وَلا إِيَّاهُ وَحَّدَ مَنِ اكْتَنَهَهُ وَلا حَقِيقَتَهُ أَصَابَ مَنْ مَثَّلَهُ وَلا بِهِ صَدَّقَ مَنْ نَهَّاهُ وَلا صَمَدَ صَمْدَهُ مَنْ أَشَارَ إِلَيْهِ وَلا إِيَّاهُ عَنَى مَنْ شَبَّهَهُ“
translation: “So it is not God whose Essence is recognized through striking similitude. It is not His Unity that is professed by someone who attempts to fathom Him. It is not His reality (haqiqa) that is attained by someone who strikes a similitude for Him. It is not He who is confirmed (tasdiq) by him who professes an end for Him. If one points to Him, it is not God that is pointed to. It is not He who is meant by him who compares Him (to something)” [ Uyun-al-Akhbar,chapter#11,hadith#51]

There can be nothing similar [مشابہ] to God because if something is said to be similar to Him or like Him then it means both God and this thing which is similar to Him or like Him would share a meaning together which may be referred to as an aspect of similarity [ جھت اشتراک ], but if they only have this aspect of similarity in their essences and nothing else then they cannot be two distinct and separate entities but since they are two and not one, therefore they must also have an aspect of difference and distinction [ جھت امتياز ] as well in their essences that separates one from the other thereby creating otherness between them, but this would render them composites [ مرکب ] of an aspect of similarity and an aspect of differentiation and as has been stated earlier that every composite is rendered subsistent through another [ قايم بالغير ] and is necessary through another [ واجب بالغيرہ ] and hence cannot simultaneously be Necessary in Itself [ واجب بالذات ], as that leads to a conjunction of contraries [ اجتماع نقيضين ], this proves that the Necessary Being is truly One [ واحد ] & Unique, and is without any similitude.

Things that are said to be similar are either similar by reason of belonging to the same species [ نوع ] such as humanity, or by reason of belonging to the same genus [ جنس ] or sharing in an accidental feature or property [کيفيۃ] such as whiteness in a white horse and a white piece of cloth ; now God cannot belong to a genus because a genus is a quiditty [ ماھيۃ ] that is rendered subsistent in concrete reality [ وجود خارج ] by a differential [ فصل ] and is thereby subsistent through another, whereas God is subsistent in itself [ قايم بالذات ] and renders all other things subsistent and is not dependent upon another for its realization [ تحقق ] in concrete existence, whereas a genus is realized through a differential ; secondly genus is a quiditty, whereas God does not have a quiditty because contingency [ امکان ذاتی ] is a necessary feature of every quiditty but God being Necessary in Essence has no quiditty distinct and apart from His existence. Similarly God cannot be said to belong to a species since every species is a composite of a genus and a differential for instance the human species is a composite of the genus animalia [ حيوانيۃ ] and the differential intellect [ عقل ] and is rendered subsistent through these.

It is equally impossible for God to be a subject [موضوع] of some quality or accident [عرض] that he shares with some other thing, such as the commonality of whiteness between the cloth and the horse, because every subject is either such that it is independent of some other subject for its realization and subsistence in concrete reality, in which case it would be a substance or it is such that it is dependent upon it ; now if the former then God would have to be a substance but a substance is of the order of quiditty, whereas God has no quiditty and therefore cannot be a substance ; and if the latter, then God would itself be an accident and all accidents are dependent for their realization and subsistence upon a subject, but God being Absolute cannot be dependent upon another.

God cannot be pointed at because it is only things that have a certain position, direction and occupy a certain space [مکان] that can be pointed to, and everything that occupies space and has a position or a direction is corporeal [جسمانی], where a body is defined as a three-dimensional substance, where a substance is a quiditty that is independent of a subject for its concrete existence, but God cannot be a substance because He has no quiditty ; moreover every body is a measured thing as it possesses the form of measure [صورۃ مقداريۃ] but God cannot be something measured because everything measured is limited [محدود] ; also because every body is a composite that contains actual parts [اجزاء], whereas God being the Simplest Reality [بسيط الحقيقۃ] is far exalted above composition and similitude. Every body occupies a certain space that contains and encompasses it, but God cannot be contained or encompassed by anything, in fact it is God that encompasses all things in His Knowledge and Might.