Imam Reza (as) On the Identity of the Essence & the Attributes

Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Sinani - may God be pleased with him - narrated that Muhammad ibn Abi Abdullah al-Kufi quoted on the authority of Muhammad ibn Isma’il al-Barmaki, on the authority of Al-Husayn ibn Al-Hassan, on the authority of Muhammad ibn Isa, on the authority of Muhammad ibn Arafa, “I asked Al-Ridha’ (a.s.), ‘Did God create things using His Might or without it? The Imam (a.s.) replied:

"خَلَقَ اللَّهُ الأَشْياءِ بِالقُدرَةِ أَم بِغَيْرِ القُدرَةِ؟ فَقالَ‏ عَلَيْهِ السَّلامُ: لا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَكُونَ خَلَقَ الأَشْياءَ بِالقُدرَةِ لأَنَّكَ إِذا قُلْتُ: خَلَقَ الأَشْياءَ بِالقُدرَةِ، فَكَأَنَّكَ قَدْ جُعِلْتَ القُدرَةَ شَيْئاً غَيْرَهُ وَجَعَلتَها آلَةً لَهُ بِها خَلَقَ الأَشْياءَ، وَهذا شِركٌ، وَإِذا قُلْتُ خَلَقَ الأَشْياءَ بِغَيْرِ قُدْرَةٍ فَإِنَّّما تَصِفُهُ أَنَّهُ جَعَلَها بِاقتِدارٍ عَلَيْها وَقُدْرَةٍ، وَلكِن لَيْسَ هُوَبِضَعيفٍ وَلا عاجِزٍ وَلا مُحْتاجٍ إِلى غَيْرِهِ، بَل هُوَسُبحانَهُ قادِرٌ لِذاتِهِ لا بِالقُدرَةِ"

translation: "You cannot say that God created things using His Might since when you say that God has created thing using His Might, you are considering His Might to be something other than Him. Saying that God has created things using the Might He has had over them is like saying that God’s Might is something other than Him, and He has used it as a tool with which He creates. This is polytheism. When you say that God has created things using some other Might, it is as if you consider that Might to be separate from Him and He gets His Power over things using it. However, God is neither weak and incapable, nor is He in need of others. He is Glorified, and Mighty in nature, and not via an external power." [Uyun Akhbar Ar Ridha,Vol#1,chapter#11,hadith#7]

If the divine attributes [صفات الاھيۃ] are held to be additional to [زايد بر ذات] and existentially [وجودی] distinct or separate from His Essence [ذات] such that God has knowledge [علم] of all that exists due to the attribute of knowledge [صفت علم] which is a reality [حقيقۃ] distinct and separate from His Essence and has power [قدرۃ] over all that exists by virtue of the attribute of Power [صفت قدرۃ] which is distinct from his Essence, so this would imply His Essence being dependent [مہتاج] upon another entity [غير], meaning the attributes, and dependence is evidence of the existence of an imperfection [نقص] in that which suffers from dependence, but it is impossible for Absolute Perfection [کمال مطلق] and the Ultimate Good [خير مطلق] to be imperfect [ناقص] in any manner, in fact God being Necessary in Itself [واجب بالذات] must be necessary from all aspects [واجب من جميع الجھات], whereas that which is dependent cannot simultaneously be necessary from all aspects, and since a conjunction of contraries [اجتماع نقيضين] is impossible therefore the Divine cannot be dependent upon another.

If the attributes are thought to be existentially additional to and distinct from the Essence so this would render God a composite [مرکب] of His Essence and the Attributes and every composite by reason of deriving its reality and subsistence [قوام] from its parts [اجزا] is necessary through another and hence cannot be necessary in itself, because that which is Necessary in Itself is the First-Cause [علت اول], meaning that it is the cause of all that is endowed with existence, but a composite cannot be the cause of its own parts because no composite can have precedence over its parts in existence, in other words a composite cannot exist prior to its parts because its parts are the internal-causes of its being and therefore must exist prior to the composite; but if a composite is said to exist prior to its parts so that would imply its having existence prior to and without that on which it subsists, but this is absurd, since this would mean that a thing is able to subsist without that on which it subsists.

Everything that is necessary through another cannot simultaneously be necessary in itself, and that which exists but is not necessary in itself must consequently be essentially-contingent [ممکن بالذات], and every contingent is in need of a cause for its existence, and thus cannot be the First Being [موجود اول] and the First Cause.