Avicenna On Divine Knowledge

If God exists, does He possess knowledge, and if He does, so what is the extent, if any, of divine knowledge, and How does God know what He knows; these are some of the questions that had eluded the most erudite philosophical intellects since the dawn of philosophy until the greatest Islamic Philosophers such as Avicenna and Mulla Sadra illuminated the issues concerning Divine Knowledge.

For Avicenna God not only possesses knowledge but His knowledge surpasses the knowledge of all contingent beings capable of possessing knowledge. Avicenna demonstrates this by stating that all existential-perfections such as knowledge, are consequential upon existence itself, which means that in the external reality a perfection say ‘y’, can only be predicated to a subject say ‘x’, if the subject ‘x’ first exists itself, that is in order for ‘x’ to be predicable with ‘y’, ‘x’ must first be endowed with or possess existence, otherwise it would be meaningless to assert the predication of ‘y’ in the external reality to something which is non-existent. Therefore the perfections of an existent are dependent upon its existence hence if the existence of an essence is known to be contingent and caused, so all its existential-perfections such as knowledge will also be contingent and caused because that which depends upon a contingent is itself also contingent; and if the cause of knowledge in a contingent-essence is an essence such as itself, meaning an essence which is contingent with respect to existence and existential-perfections such as knowledge, so the same question reverts towards it and so on and so forth, but since infinite regress is impossible therefore the question will lead to an Essence which itself is Knowledge, such that in the case of God, knowledge is not an attribute additional to and distinct from, the Divine Essence, but the attribute is identical to the Essence itself, such that the attribute is the Essence.

In other words divine knowledge like every other divine attribute of perfection, cannot be consequent upon or additional to, the divine essence because assuming it is something additional to and consequential upon the divine essence, so the ascription or association of this attribute with the Essence would be either due to the essence itself, or due to another; now if the ascription or association of this attribute with the Essence is due to another so that would mean that the Necessary Being in Itself would have been rendered necessary with respect to the perfection of knowledge, by another, when it had been assumed to be Necessary in Itself from all aspects, including knowledge, and that is a contradiction, because that which is rendered necessary through another from any aspect, cannot simultaneously be necessary from all aspects. Now if the ascription or association of the attribute of knowledge with the Essence is due to the Essence itself so it would either be included within the meaning of the Necessary Being or it would not be included within its meaning; now if it is included within the meaning of the Necessary Being such that the meaning of the Necessary Being would not be complete without it, so this is exactly what is meant by the attribute being identical to the Essence; and if it is excluded from the meaning of the Necessary Being, being something additional to it, so that would render God a composite of Essence and the attribute of knowledge and every composite is dependent upon its parts for effecting the composition and is therefore rendered necessary through another and that which is necessary through another cannot simultaneously be necessary in itself, when it had been assumed to be necessary in itself and this is once again a contradiction.

Moreover whatever perfections are found to exist in an effect, undoubtedly also exist in its existential-cause in a more eminent manner because to assert the contrary would be tantamount to asserting the existence of an effect [meaning the said perfection] without there being any cause for it, when it has been assumed to have a cause, being contingent in essence; therefore since some contingent beings [such as Man] do possess knowledge, this is sufficient proof of the possession of knowledge by the Divine Being who is the First-Cause of all that exists. This establishes the fact that God not only possesses Knowledge but also that His Knowledge is not something added to and distinct from or consequential upon, His Essence, but is identical to the Divine Essence.

Now how does God know what He knows; does He know the knowable objects existing in reality by the intellectual apprehension of those objects, meaning that is His knowledge of a thing say ‘x’ dependent upon the intellectual-apprehension of ‘x’ by His Essence, or does He know what he knows by some other means; now if it is asserted that He knows ‘x’ through the intellectual-apprehension of ‘x’ by His Essence, so that would render Divine Knowledge dependent upon contingent beings and hence necessitated by another [meaning the contingents] and that which is necessitated by another in any aspect cannot simultaneously be necessary from all aspects, as that would be a contradiction, and that which is not necessary from all aspects, cannot be Necessary in Itself; additionally it may also be stated that in the case of contingents belonging to the physical world of generation and corruption, and hence being subject to change, God’s knowledge would also become something changeable if it is asserted that He knows ‘x’ through the intellectual-apprehension of ‘x’ by His Essence, and this would also render the Divine Essence changeable since it has already been proven above that His Knowledge [like all the other attributes] is identical to His Essence, and this is inadmissible because that which is changeable is possible in the aspect in which it is changeable and hence cannot be necessary from all aspects, and consequently cannot be Necessary in Itself.

If Divine Knowledge is rendered dependent upon the changeable contingents so that would also necessitate change in that Knowledge and consequently also render the Essence changeable as has been stated above, this would mean that the Divine Essence were a composite of actuality and potentiality, and every composite is rendered necessary though its parts and is hence essentially-contingent and therefore cannot contemporaneously be Necessary in Itself. Moreover to assert that in order to be knowledgeable God is dependent upon the externally-existing known objects, would render the divine essence imperfect because God would only know objects that actually do exist, but would have no knowledge of things that are as yet non-existent but would only become a knowing-being with respect to these things once they become realized in existence, and this is inadmissible, because the Necessary Being is the Ultimate and Absolute Perfection but that which is perfectible in terms of knowledge cannot simultaneously be the Ultimate and Absolute Perfection. This therefore proves that Divine Knowledge is not dependent upon the externally-existing known objects.

Therefore if God does not know what He knows through the intellectual-apprehension of the known by His Essence, and if His Knowledge is not dependent upon the existence of contingents so How does He know what He knows; Avicenna solves this mystery by stating that to know the causes of ‘x’ is equivalent to knowing ‘x’ itself, meaning that in the case of a ‘wooden-table’ if we know about the efficient, formal, material and final causes of the ‘wooden-table’ so that would be the same as knowing the ‘wooden-table’ itself; now since God’s Essence is the Ultimate and the First Cause of all that exists hence knowing the Essence would be equivalent to knowing all, because if knowing the cause of ‘x’ is the same as knowing ‘x’, so knowing the Cause of everything would be the same as knowing all things. Now God intellects His Own Essence by the Essence itself, in as much as the Essence is the First and the Ultimate Cause of all things and since knowing the Cause of everything is the same as knowing all things, therefore God by knowing Himself as the Cause of All, knows All, such that nothing escapes from His Knowledge which encompasses all things, and by knowing All, He creates All [in as much as the All is possible in essence], because His Knowledge is identical to His Will to create, such that for Him, to know is to create [in as much as that which is known and created is possible in essence]. Therefore God intellects His Own Essence by the Essence itself, as the Cause of All, and by doing so knows all things; by intellecting His Own Self He knows Himself to be the Ultimate Final and Efficient Cause, the Absolute Good and Perfection, Pure Existence and the Object of Universal Desire.

Now the extent of God’s knowledge has been a matter of some concern and debate among both the theologians as well as the philosophers where it was held by some that God knows both the universals as well as the particulars, and by some others that He only knows the universals without knowing the particulars; both these positions are prone to criticism in that if God knows only the universals then His Knowledge would be imperfect and incomplete, and if He knows both the universals as well as the particulars in as much as they are particulars, so this would lead to a multiplicity of particulars within the Divine Essence, and this is also inadmissible. Avicenna states that God knows the particulars in a universal manner; now to say that God knows the particulars in a universal manner is not indicative of any ambiguity in divine knowledge but the simplicity and the unity thereof. Therefore He knows all universals and particulars down to the minutest details such that nothing even less than an atom’s weight escapes His Knowledge.