Objections to the Eternity of the World and their solutions

The Philosophers assert that even if the world were to be eternal, it would still be an effect and consequently dependent upon a cause for its existence due to its essential contingency امکان ذاتی; the theologians object to this assertion by stating that an eternal world would be independent of a cause for bringing it into being, since it was never non-existent to be brought into existence in the first place; for the theologians, in order for an existent to be an effect it is necessary for its existence to be preceded by non-existence; here their eyes are fixed on temporal non-existence عدم زمانی only; they failed to realize that, that which an effect has due to its cause is its existence, whereas that which it has due to itself is essential-non-existence عدم ذاتی; therefore even an eternal world is brought into existence by its cause from essential non-existence albeit the world was never temporally non-existent. 

The theologians also object to the notion of the eternity of the world on the ground that it would lead to a multiplicity of eternals تعدد قدماء; here also as before they fail to distinguish between being eternal in itself قدیم بالذات and being eternal through another قدیم بالغیر; the world and all that it contains is eternal through another, namely God, whereas God is eternal in itself; the world derives its eternity from the First Cause and is not eternal in its own essence; therefore even an eternal world does not lead to a multiplicity of beings that are eternal in themselves.

The theologians argue that in order for an agent فاعل to be a free-agent فاعل قادر و مختار its essence ذات must exist prior to the existence of its act or effect; therefore simultaneity between a cause and its effect negates the possession of free will by the cause; hence, if the world were to be eternal and consequently simultaneous with the Necessary Being واجب الوجود, so this would negate the presence of free will in its agent-cause namely the Divine Essence; in response to this objection the Philosophers simply state that a free agent is not one whose essence is temporally prior in existence to its effect or act, but one whose act emanates from its free will; it makes no difference whether this act or effect is contemporaneous with its agent-cause or is posterior to it in time; in fact the more ontologically intense and sublime the cause, the greater is its ability to eliminate non-existence from its effect, and an Omnipotent Being قادر مطلق must be able to remove non-being from its effect absolutely.

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