On Mediate and Immediate Knowledge

I gaze at an orange tree, veiled with green leaves; bedecked with luscious oranges dangling from the branches; I see all this beauty that nature presents thus ornamented, through my corporeal sight; but that which my sight apprehends directly without any intermediary, is not something entified existent in the concrete reality حقیقت خارجیه; but it is a sensible form صورت حسیه of the concrete orange tree found in the external reality; the tree that subsists in the external reality is apprehended by my vision through this sensible form, which functions as a mirror image with respect to the tree outside; it serves as an incorporeal image of something material; but just as the image seen within the mirror is dependent upon the presence حضور of the object of which it is the image, similarly the sensible form of the orange tree is reliant upon the constant presence of the external tree for its subsistence قوام within the apprehending soul نفس مدرکه; the soul perceives the tree outside, through the sensible form, but its apprehension of the form itself is immediate بلا واسطه and not by means of anything else; the tree within is a shadow of the sensible tree شجر حسی outside; because the soul perceives the sensible tree by means of an intermediary sensible form, and not by grasping the reality of the sensible tree itself in an immediate manner, therefore its knowledge of the reality of the concrete object remains imperfect and error prone.

Now my eyes look within the self; endeavoring to recollect the image of the object outside; the faculty of imagination presents the same form before my vision; this is an imaginal form صورت متخیله of the orange tree outside; unlike the sensible form it is not dependent upon matter for its subsistence in the soul and is therefore more intensely incorporeal مجرد than the sensible form; this imaginal form is a mirror image of the imaginal tree شجر مثالی which is an entified concrete reality subsistent in the imaginal realm عالم مثال; the soul apprehends the imaginal tree by means of the imaginal form within itself, but its apprehension of the imaginal form is immediate; because the soul perceives the entified imaginal tree by means of an intermediary imaginal form, and not by grasping the reality of the imaginal tree itself in an immediate manner, therefore its knowledge of the reality of the concrete object remains imperfect and error prone.

Nevertheless, this imaginal form is not perfectly incorporeal since it possesses material accidents عوارض مادی such as color, shape, dimensions etc; according to the Peripatetic Philosophers such as Avicenna, these material accidents are the individuating factors due to which particulars sharing the same quiddity ماهیه happen to be distinct from each other; the intellect عقل then abstracts the universal essence of a tree by removing from it, these individuating corporeal accidents; once the imaginal form is denuded by the intellect from these individuating accidents, that which remains behind as a residue is an intelligible knowledge form صورت علمیه عقلیه; this intelligible knowledge form is a mirror image and a reflection of the Intelligible tree شجر عقلی that subsists in the intelligible world عالم عقل, but because the soul perceives the Intelligible tree by means of an intermediary intelligible form, and not by grasping the reality of the intelligible tree itself in an immediate manner, therefore its knowledge of the reality of the entified object remains imperfect and fallible.

Every level of perception ادراک namely sensible, imaginal and intelligible corresponds to and points towards a particular concrete existent subsistent in the entified reality; but the reason why my soul knows or apprehends the sensible, imaginal and intelligible realities imperfectly through the intermediation of forms, is because the sensible, imaginal and intelligible trees lie unencompassed by my self; it is exactly because my soul does not encompasses these concrete things, that it depends upon the intermediate forms for perception; but the sensible, imaginal and intelligible forms themselves are known by the soul in a direct and immediate manner with a perfect knowledge that is immune to error; this is because these forms do not lie outside my soul, and are not known to the soul by means of something else; neither are they identical to my soul; to elaborate, the soul is not these forms, nor are the forms the soul; in fact these forms are created by the soul itself as a result of emanation صدور or illumination اشراق; the relation between God and the contingent world عالم امکان is the same.

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