Sadrian Metaphysics

Mullah Sadra like Avicenna before him defines matter ماده as a substance جوهر that bears potentiality قوه, or as a pure-potentiality قوه محض; but since pure potentiality is the complete absence of actuality فعلیه therefore according to Avicenna even the substantiality of matter is not indicative of any concrete existence وجود عینی, since any kind of concrete existence implies the presence of actuality; therefore the substantiality of matter is instead indicative of the fact that prime matter هیولا اولا or pure potentiality doesn't inhere within a subject موضوع; the concrete existence of matter and its actuality is due to form صورته, which is a substance that perfects or actualizes matter; this form is effused upon matter by an incorporeal separate intellect عقل مفارق known as the Active-Intellect عقل فعال which is the last of the vertical immaterial intellects عقول مجرده; therefore that due to which matter possesses subsistence قوام in reality حقیقه is called form; therefore the ma

The nature and character of Divine Agency like so many other issues, has been a matter of some dispute between the rival schools of Muslim Philosophers and Theologians; according to the latter of these schools an agent فاعل of an act فعل can only be justly considered as a free agent فاعل قادر و مختار if it is possible for the Essence of the Agent ذات فاعل to exist without the essence of the act ذات فعل existing with it; but if it is impossible for the Agent's Essence to exist without the essence of its act also existing with it, then such an Agent fails to qualify as a free agent, and must be considered a natural agent فاعل طبیعی such as fire whose act in the form of the heat produced by it, is inseparable from the essence of fire itself, because it is impossible for there to be a fire that is not productive of heat; in the view of the theologians in order for an agent to qualify as a free agent it is necessary for the essence of its act to be temporally posterior متاخر بالزمان to

The criterion for an effect's need or dependence احتیاج upon a cause علت was a hotly debated issue in the intellectual history of Islam among philosophers فلاسفہ and theologians متکلمین; according to the latter of these two schools, meaning the theologians, the criterion for an effect's dependence upon a cause was temporal--origination حدوث, whereas for the philosophers that criterion was essential-contingency امکان ذاتی; the philosophers defined Quidittative or Essential Contingency as the negation of both the necessity of existence وجوب وجود as well as the necessity of nonexistence وجوب عدم; therefore a contingent quiddity ماھیت ممکنہ is one for which neither existence, nor nonexistence is necessary, but both are possible ممکن; hence a contingent essence is one that can both be and not be but for which it is not necessary to either be or not to be; it is evident that in the view of the Philosophers a contingent quiddity is in a state of equilibrium with respect to both being

Motion which is defined as the transition or the transference of a body from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality, and being one of the Aristotelian categories, is an accident; now an accident is a quiddity which is dependent upon a subject or a substrate for its subsistence or realization in concrete reality; and since motion is also an accident therefore it is also in need of a subject or a substrate in which to inhere for realization or subsistence in concrete existence; now this subject or substrate of motion is a body, which is defined as a three dimensional substance; now all bodies are corporealized and material and as a consequence of this are temporal and spatial realities that possess a specific direction and position, and being material in character all bodies are composites of an existent actuality and an expected potentiality for the reception of some new incoming form; without the existence of a potential for receiving form there can be no motion or movement; n

One does get confused regarding whether or not Mullah Sadra was a monist or a pantheist when we read statements such as 'the contingents are both the Real حق and not the Real غیر حق, albeit in differing respects, because they are the Real in the sense of their existential perfections and the good which they possess; but not the Real in the sense of the imperfections, privations or negations that plague these contingents in as much as they are contingent, since the Necessary Existent being Absolute-Perfection کمال مطلق in Itself is devoid of all such imperfections and negations while simultaneously being not just perfect but beyond perfection فوق کمال; in other words if we consider contingent existence and cancel all the imperfections and negations associated with these existences in as much as they are contingent, so we arrive at the Reality of Existence حقیقت الوجود, or the True Unity وحدت حقا, as is also stated by Shabistari in his 'the Mystic Rose Garden' گلشن راز, that

According to Mullah Sadra the more intense the existence in the arc of ascent the more free it is from the shackles of time and space, and the higher the grade of existence in the arc the more incorporeal it happens to be, such that the ontological intensity of an Existent is indirectly proportionate to the degree of it's association and attachment with matter; therefore the stronger the attachment and association of an existent with matter the more corporeal and weaker it is, in terms of Existence; and the farther removed an Existent is from attachment and association with matter the more intense it happens to be in terms of Existence. Now since Pure Existence is the origin and source of all existence, and being such it is necessarily the Noblest and the Greatest of all existents, because every good and perfection emanates from this August Reality and traces its origin back to it; therefore just as the objects nearest to the Sun receive the greatest amount of light by virtue of

"If every existent were such that it enters imagination and the senses, then the senses and imagination would also enter the senses and imagination. The intellect which is the true judge would also enter imagination. But, after these principles, [we find that] no love, shyness, fear, anger, courage, and cowardice is among that which enters the senses and imagination, [even though] they are among that which attaches to sensible things. What, then, do you think of existent things, if their essences lie outside the order and attachments of the sensibles?" According to Avicenna Existence is not just confined to that which is capable of apprehension by the senses or the faculty of imagination, because if the contrary is held to be true then the senses must also necessarily be capable of apprehension by themselves if they truly exist for instance is the faculty of sight exists so it must be able to apprehend itself, but we know that sight does not perceive itself; similarl

"You must know that [some] people’s imagination may be overcome [by the opinion] that the existent is sensible, that the existence of that whose substance is not grasped by the senses is supposed impossible, and that that which in itself is not specified by a space or a position, such as the body, or by the cause in which it resides, such as the states of the body, does not have a chance to exist. It is possible for you to reflect on the sensible itself and learn from this the falsity of the statements of such people; for both you and he who deserves to be addressed know that one name may apply to these sensibles (p. 8) not by way of pure homonymy but in accordance with the same sense, such as the name human being. Neither of you doubts that this name applies to Zayd and Amr in the same real sense. This real sense cannot be such that it is either grasped by the senses or it is not. If it is far from being grasped by the senses, then our investigation has brought wha