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Showing posts from February, 2019

On the Platonic Refutation of Gorgias

The Greek Philosopher Gorgias who together with Protagoras is recognized as one of the first generation Sophists سوفسطائیان, is said to have famously remarked that nothing exists, and even if anything were to exist, it could never be known; and even if it were possible for someone to know it, he could never communicate what he knows to others. This assertion constitutes firstly a denial of existence وجود and consequently a denial of knowledge علم; because a thing can only be known if it exists, and therefore that which is non-existent معدوم in every way, cannot be known in any manner; the assertion is not only a denial of existence and the possibility of knowledge امکان علم but is also a denial of the possibility of certainty امکان یقین in knowledge; because certainty in knowledge can only be possible through the possibility of knowledge itself; but the absence and impossibility of knowledge and certainty implies the absence or non-existence of truth حق. Plato opposed the above notio

On Transmigration

The Pythagoreans believed that the human soul نفس was a captive, imprisoned within the material body جسم as a result of its sin; and if a particular human soul was unable to attain perfection کمال in terms of purification تذکیه نفس from sin in a single life time, so it would have to suffer through a prolonged captivity in the form of transmigration or metapsychosis تناسخ, until the said purification or perfection is achieved. Metapsychosis involves the transference انتقال of the soul on death to a body other than the one it previously occupied or was associated with; this subsequent body may either be a plant نبات, an animal حیوان, or another human being انسان; but Muslim Philosophers such as Avicenna and Mullah Sadra consider transmigration of the soul to be impossible ممتنع, and Mullah Sadra in particular presents a number of reasons for considering it as such. The purpose غرض of the soul's attachment with the physical body is to seek existential perfection through the gradua

On the Attributes of Action

The Attributes of God are classified into the Attributes of Essence صفات ذات, and the Attributes of Action صفات فعل; where the former  namely the attributes of essence denote an existential perfection کمال وجود in the Divine Essence ذات حق, such as Life حیات, Knowledge علم and Power قدرت; and are integral to the Essence, which means that there is no Ontic distinction between these attributes of God and His Essence, such that these attributes are identical to the Essence عین ذات; the intellectual abstraction عقلی انتزاع of these properties only requires the intellectual consideration اعتبار عقلی of the Divine Essence alone without the consideration of anything else besides the Essence; therefore here the intellectual consideration of the Essence alone is sufficient for the abstraction of these attributes; the latter attributes namely the attributes of action denote a particular relation اضافه or connection تعلق between the Creator خالق or the Necessary Existent واجب بالذات and His creat

On Love in the Thought of Avicenna & Sadra

Love عشق according to the Philosophers is a yearning and a seeking in the essence of the lover عاشق for some real خیر حقیقی or imagined good خیر مظنون; but there can be no searching in relation to that which is already possessed by the lover; therefore seeking or searching occur only in relation to something absent; something that presently lies beyond the reach of the lover; this understanding of the concept of love مفهوم عشق is true only in the case of things associated with the physical realm عالم طبیعه, which is a realm of constant change تغیر and transformation تبدل and is not applicable to entities that belong to the intelligible world عالم عقل; a world of immutable ثابت and actual بالفعل beings that are free from matter ماده and material attributes عوارض ماده. Avicenna in his 'Treatise on Love' رساله فی العشق states that all existents موجودات have been divinely inspired with an innate love or yearning زوق for good and perfection کمال; but the nature and the intensity ش

Avicenna's argument for the Impossibility of Infinite Regress

A causal series is a chain of existents connected together by the relation of causality such that some members are the causes of others and certain others are the effects of others; now a causal series may either be definite and finite, or alternatively indefinite and infinite; a finite causal series is one which has a pure cause and a pure effect as its extremes, where a pure cause is an existent that is only a cause of all the other posterior members of the causal chain without itself being the effect of any; and a pure effect is an existent that is only an effect of all the prior members of the series without itself being the cause of any; besides a pure cause and a pure effect, a finite causal series may consist of several intermediate members, each of which is both a cause in relation to the member posterior to it, as well as an effect in relation to the one prior to it; now if we consider a definite or finite causal series consisting of only three members say a,b & c, where &

Necessity and Possibility not entified realities

Necessity وجوب and Possibility امکان are not entified realities حقائق عینی neither are these notions مفاھیم primary philosophical intelligibles معقولات اولیہ similar to universal quiditties ماھیت کلی, that are abstracted by the Intellect عقل from entified existences; there is nothing in the objective world that can be pointed to and singled out as necessity or possibility just as the concept of ownership is not something endowed with concrete existence وجود خارج in the real world, but is a notion that is abstracted from specific entified existences belonging to the essences of the owner and the owned, because that which exists in concreto are the essences of the owner and the owned, and not ownership, but the mind abstracts this concept of ownership from the relation اضافہ that subsists between the two; in fact even the owner and the owned are not entified realities per se but are properties that are attributed or predicated to specific quiditties, therefore the mind predicates the att

On the Intelligibles

An intelligible معقول is something that is either (a) self-intellecting and also capable of intellectual apprehension ادراک عقلی by another or (b) only capable of intellectual apprehension by another but not self-intellecting; the former are the incorporeal intellects عقول مجردہ that are separate from matter مفارق عن المادہ and are  intelligible to themselves in actuality  معقول بالفعل, meaning that they are aware of themselves by their very selves بالذات and not by means of an intermediate form صورہ; and are also potentially intelligible معقول بالقوہ or capable of intellectual apprehension by another, where that other is an actual or perfected human intellect عقل بالفعل or a saintly soul نفس قدسیہ; the latter intelligibles are quiditties ماھیات immersed in matter that are potentially intelligible prior to abstraction انتزاع عقلی by the apprehending Intellect, and intelligible in actuality after abstraction from matter and material attributes عوارض مادی; the self-intellecting intelligi