On the Attributes of Action
The Attributes of God are classified into the Attributes of Essence صفات ذات, and the Attributes of Action صفات فعل; where the former namely the attributes of essence denote an existential perfection کمال وجود in the Divine Essence ذات حق, such as Life حیات, Knowledge علم and Power قدرت; and are integral to the Essence, which means that there is no Ontic distinction between these attributes of God and His Essence, such that these attributes are identical to the Essence عین ذات; the intellectual abstraction عقلی انتزاع of these properties only requires the intellectual consideration اعتبار عقلی of the Divine Essence alone without the consideration of anything else besides the Essence; therefore here the intellectual consideration of the Essence alone is sufficient for the abstraction of these attributes; the latter attributes namely the attributes of action denote a particular relation اضافه or connection تعلق between the Creator خالق or the Necessary Existent واجب بالذات and His creation مخلوق or the contingent beings ممکنات, and the intellectual abstraction of these attributes is dependent upon the intellectual consideration of the Divine Essence and something additional to the Essence زائد بر ذات as well; to elaborate further, the intellectual consideration of the Divine Essence alone is not sufficient for the abstraction of the attributes of action; examples of these attributes include, the creator خالق, the sustainer رازق, the speaker متکلم etc; for instance the abstraction of the attribute of creator is dependent upon the consideration of both the Essence of the Creator ذات خالق as well as the essence of the created ذات مخلوق; similarly the abstraction of the attribute of being a sustainer is dependent upon the intellectual consideration of the essence of the Sustainer ذات رازق and the essence of the sustained ذات مرزوق.
Hence the attributes of action are said to be additional to the Essence زائد بر ذات in the sense that the abstraction of these attributes by the mind عقل is not only dependent upon the Divine Essence alone, but also requires another essence in addition to the Essence of God; however, when it is said that the attributes of action are additional to the Essence so by this statement the Philosophers do not mean to assert an ontological or real distinction in the external reality حقیقت خارجیه between the Divine Essence and these properties; nor do they mean to assert that these attributes of action are entified or concrete existences وجودات عینیه distinct from the Divine Essence; the true purport behind regarding the attributes of action as being additional to the Essence, is that according to the Philosophers the abstraction of these properties by the mind is dependent upon the intellectual consideration of two essences, namely the Essence of the Divine and an additional essence of the created or contingent world عالم امکان.
Those who think that the attributes of action are additional to the Essence in an entified and concrete manner, such that these properties are concrete realities having existences that are ontologically distinct and separate from the Divine Being وجود الاھی, have committed a huge error; this due to the fact that such an assertion renders God a composite of His Essence and these properties, and composition is the negation of Absolute Simplicity بساطت; and consequently that which is composite in any manner cannot be the Simplest Reality بسیط الحقیقه; but since God is the Simplest Reality, therefore His being a composite of Essence and the attributes of action is impossible; moreover to assert that the attributes of action are ontologically additional to the Divine Essence entails that God becomes a Creator by virtue of the attribute of creation خلاقیت, or that He becomes a Sustainer by reason of the attribute of sustaining رزاقیت, and this is inadmissible because such an assertion renders the Divine Essence dependent محتاج upon its attributes of action; and dependence is a concomitant لازمه of contingency امکان ذاتی, and contingency is the negation of necessity وجوب; which means that everything dependent is contingent and hence cannot simultaneously be Necessary in Itself; but since God is a Necessary Being therefore He cannot be dependent upon anything; and consequently the attributes of action cannot be additional to the Essence in an entified and concrete manner.
Furthermore, to assert that the attributes of action are additional to the Essence in an entified and concrete manner entails two possibilities: (1) it is either the case (a) that these properties are accidents عوارض in relation to the Essence, and the Essence is their subject موضوع, or (b) these attributes are as form صورہ in relation to the Essence, and the Essence is as matter مادہ in relation to these properties, Or (2) these attributes are neither accidents nor form, in relation to the Essence, but the Essence and these attributes together constitute a greater whole; now if (1a) be the case such that the attributes of action are as accidents in relation to the Essence, so this would render God a substance-accident duality and a composite; now this is impossible since duality is the negation of Unity وحدت and that which is a composite is rendered necessary through another and therefore cannot simultaneously be necessary in itself; moreover if the Essence were to be a subject in relation to the attributes of action, so the Essence would either itself be within a subject for subsistence قوام in concrete reality; or alternatively, it would be independent of a subject for its external subsistence; now if it is held to be dependent on a subject for its subsistence, then it would itself be an accident عرض, since everything that is dependent upon a subject for its subsistence in the external reality, is an accident; and every accident is essentially contingent; therefore it is impossible for the Essence to inhere within a subject for its subsistence; now if it is independent of a subject for concrete subsistence then it must necessarily be a substance جوہر, because everything that is independent of a subject for subsistence in the external reality, is a substance, and every substance has a quiddity ماھیت distinct and separable from its existence, and consequently cannot be a Necessary Being; this is due to the fact that the Necessary Being has no quiddity distinct and separate from His Existence, since His Quiddity or Essence is identical to His Being.
Now if (1b) be true, such that the relation between the Essence and the attributes of action is as the relation between matter and form, so this assumption will also lead to a number of absurdities; this is because form is a substance that perfects and actualizes matter, where matter ھیولاء is a pure-potentiality قوہ محض; but a pure-potentiality, being devoid of all actuality, has no concrete subsistence and therefore the Divine Essence being an actual reality cannot be a pure-potentiality; moreover the assertion of a matter-form relationship between the Essence and the attributes of action, would render the Divine dependent upon its properties for the derivation of its perfections, and this is also impossible as it would mean that the Essence were not necessary from all aspects, and that which is not necessary from every aspect واجب من جمیع الجحات cannot be necessary in itself واجب بالذات; and that which is not necessary in itself, but yet exists, must be possible in essence ممکن بالذات; whether the relation between the Essence and the attributes of action is similar to a substance-accident relation or a matter-form relation, either way the Essence would be rendered a recipient قابل of external influence اثر, in the form of either accidents or form; but the receiving of an influence by the Essence, can only be necessitated by some cause; and since that which causes the influence is essentially prior سابق to that which receives it, this would render God posterior to the cause of the influence; but this is impossible, because God being the Simplest Reality and the Necessary Being must be the First Existent موجود اول; moreover that which receives an influence and is therefore a passive being انفعالی, is inferior to the active-cause فعلی of the influence, but God being the Supreme Being can be inferior to none; in fact every reality is inferior to this Supreme Being.
Now if (2) be the case, such that the connection between the Essence and the attributes of action, is neither similar to a substance-accident relation, nor like a matter-form one, but is such that the Essence together with the attributes of action, constitutes a whole; and since every whole is greater than its parts, this would thereby result in the Divine Essence being lesser than the whole, which is absurd. Therefore with respect to the entified or concrete reality all Divine Attributes, are identical and integral عین ذات to the Essence regardless of whether they are attributes of essence or attributes of action; in other words, in relation to the external reality, no attribute is ontologically additional to the Essence زائد بر ذات, regardless of whether they are attributes of essence or attributes of action; this is because in order to be a Creator, or a Sustainer, the Essence of God is self-sufficient صمد, without any need for it to seek external assistance or influence from any other; in fact truth be told every being seeks Divine succor and grace فیض for being what it is.
Hence the attributes of action are said to be additional to the Essence زائد بر ذات in the sense that the abstraction of these attributes by the mind عقل is not only dependent upon the Divine Essence alone, but also requires another essence in addition to the Essence of God; however, when it is said that the attributes of action are additional to the Essence so by this statement the Philosophers do not mean to assert an ontological or real distinction in the external reality حقیقت خارجیه between the Divine Essence and these properties; nor do they mean to assert that these attributes of action are entified or concrete existences وجودات عینیه distinct from the Divine Essence; the true purport behind regarding the attributes of action as being additional to the Essence, is that according to the Philosophers the abstraction of these properties by the mind is dependent upon the intellectual consideration of two essences, namely the Essence of the Divine and an additional essence of the created or contingent world عالم امکان.
Those who think that the attributes of action are additional to the Essence in an entified and concrete manner, such that these properties are concrete realities having existences that are ontologically distinct and separate from the Divine Being وجود الاھی, have committed a huge error; this due to the fact that such an assertion renders God a composite of His Essence and these properties, and composition is the negation of Absolute Simplicity بساطت; and consequently that which is composite in any manner cannot be the Simplest Reality بسیط الحقیقه; but since God is the Simplest Reality, therefore His being a composite of Essence and the attributes of action is impossible; moreover to assert that the attributes of action are ontologically additional to the Divine Essence entails that God becomes a Creator by virtue of the attribute of creation خلاقیت, or that He becomes a Sustainer by reason of the attribute of sustaining رزاقیت, and this is inadmissible because such an assertion renders the Divine Essence dependent محتاج upon its attributes of action; and dependence is a concomitant لازمه of contingency امکان ذاتی, and contingency is the negation of necessity وجوب; which means that everything dependent is contingent and hence cannot simultaneously be Necessary in Itself; but since God is a Necessary Being therefore He cannot be dependent upon anything; and consequently the attributes of action cannot be additional to the Essence in an entified and concrete manner.
Furthermore, to assert that the attributes of action are additional to the Essence in an entified and concrete manner entails two possibilities: (1) it is either the case (a) that these properties are accidents عوارض in relation to the Essence, and the Essence is their subject موضوع, or (b) these attributes are as form صورہ in relation to the Essence, and the Essence is as matter مادہ in relation to these properties, Or (2) these attributes are neither accidents nor form, in relation to the Essence, but the Essence and these attributes together constitute a greater whole; now if (1a) be the case such that the attributes of action are as accidents in relation to the Essence, so this would render God a substance-accident duality and a composite; now this is impossible since duality is the negation of Unity وحدت and that which is a composite is rendered necessary through another and therefore cannot simultaneously be necessary in itself; moreover if the Essence were to be a subject in relation to the attributes of action, so the Essence would either itself be within a subject for subsistence قوام in concrete reality; or alternatively, it would be independent of a subject for its external subsistence; now if it is held to be dependent on a subject for its subsistence, then it would itself be an accident عرض, since everything that is dependent upon a subject for its subsistence in the external reality, is an accident; and every accident is essentially contingent; therefore it is impossible for the Essence to inhere within a subject for its subsistence; now if it is independent of a subject for concrete subsistence then it must necessarily be a substance جوہر, because everything that is independent of a subject for subsistence in the external reality, is a substance, and every substance has a quiddity ماھیت distinct and separable from its existence, and consequently cannot be a Necessary Being; this is due to the fact that the Necessary Being has no quiddity distinct and separate from His Existence, since His Quiddity or Essence is identical to His Being.
Now if (1b) be true, such that the relation between the Essence and the attributes of action is as the relation between matter and form, so this assumption will also lead to a number of absurdities; this is because form is a substance that perfects and actualizes matter, where matter ھیولاء is a pure-potentiality قوہ محض; but a pure-potentiality, being devoid of all actuality, has no concrete subsistence and therefore the Divine Essence being an actual reality cannot be a pure-potentiality; moreover the assertion of a matter-form relationship between the Essence and the attributes of action, would render the Divine dependent upon its properties for the derivation of its perfections, and this is also impossible as it would mean that the Essence were not necessary from all aspects, and that which is not necessary from every aspect واجب من جمیع الجحات cannot be necessary in itself واجب بالذات; and that which is not necessary in itself, but yet exists, must be possible in essence ممکن بالذات; whether the relation between the Essence and the attributes of action is similar to a substance-accident relation or a matter-form relation, either way the Essence would be rendered a recipient قابل of external influence اثر, in the form of either accidents or form; but the receiving of an influence by the Essence, can only be necessitated by some cause; and since that which causes the influence is essentially prior سابق to that which receives it, this would render God posterior to the cause of the influence; but this is impossible, because God being the Simplest Reality and the Necessary Being must be the First Existent موجود اول; moreover that which receives an influence and is therefore a passive being انفعالی, is inferior to the active-cause فعلی of the influence, but God being the Supreme Being can be inferior to none; in fact every reality is inferior to this Supreme Being.
Now if (2) be the case, such that the connection between the Essence and the attributes of action, is neither similar to a substance-accident relation, nor like a matter-form one, but is such that the Essence together with the attributes of action, constitutes a whole; and since every whole is greater than its parts, this would thereby result in the Divine Essence being lesser than the whole, which is absurd. Therefore with respect to the entified or concrete reality all Divine Attributes, are identical and integral عین ذات to the Essence regardless of whether they are attributes of essence or attributes of action; in other words, in relation to the external reality, no attribute is ontologically additional to the Essence زائد بر ذات, regardless of whether they are attributes of essence or attributes of action; this is because in order to be a Creator, or a Sustainer, the Essence of God is self-sufficient صمد, without any need for it to seek external assistance or influence from any other; in fact truth be told every being seeks Divine succor and grace فیض for being what it is.
Comments
Post a Comment