Remarks & Admonitions; Chapter#1

"You must know that [some] people’s imagination may be overcome
[by the opinion] that the existent is sensible, that the existence of that
whose substance is not grasped by the senses is supposed impossible,
and that that which in itself is not specified by a space or a position,
such as the body, or by the cause in which it resides, such as the states
of the body, does not have a chance to exist.
It is possible for you to reflect on the sensible itself and learn
from this the falsity of the statements of such people; for both you
and he who deserves to be addressed know that one name may apply
to these sensibles (p. 8) not by way of pure homonymy but in accordance
with the same sense, such as the name human being. Neither
of you doubts that this name applies to Zayd and Amr in the same
real sense.
This real sense cannot be such that it is either grasped by the
senses or it is not. If it is far from being grasped by the senses, then our
investigation has brought what is nonsensible out of sensible things.
But this is most astonishing. If, on the other hand, it is sensible, then
it necessarily has a position, a place, a specific quantity, and a specific quality. It cannot be perceived or imagined except as such (p. 9); for
every sensible object and every imagined object is necessarily specified
by something of these states. If this is so, then it will not befit what
is not in such a state and thus will not be stated of many things that
differ in such a state.
Therefore the human being, inasmuch as his reality is one, rather
inasmuch as his primary reality has no diverse multiplicity, is not sensible
but purely intelligible. The same is true of every universal"

According to Avicenna 'existence' وجود in as much as it is 'existence' is not just sensible حسی but intelligible عقلانی as well; Avicenna refutes the belief of those who state that existence is just confined to that which is sensible, such that that which is not sensible has no existence; in other words in the opinion of such people who may be rightly called materialists مادیون, that which is not specified with a particular place مکان, position, quality کیفیت & quantity کمیت and other similar material attributes عوارض مادی, does not exist; to put it briefly in the opinion of such materialists it is only the things possessing a certain quality, quantity, position and place that can be rightly considered to exist; Avicenna refutes this notion by stating that the universal notion مفہوم کلی or essence ماھیت of a specific species نوع, say a human being انسان, is apprehended by the intellect عقل through abstraction انتزاع from concrete and particular جزئ individual instances of that species existing in the objective world عالم خارج, in other words this universal idea of a 'human-being' is arrived at through the process of abstraction from individual human beings existing in reality حقیقت; now this notion, applies to a multiplicity or a plurality کثرت of humans, but is not specified with a specific position, place, quality & quantity because if it were to be specified with the above mentioned material attributes so it would cease to be universally applicable to a multiplicity of instances, because being specified with a specific place, position, quality and quantity it would not be possible for it to correspond to those instances that of the species that are not specified with the same place, position, quality and quantity; but since the universal human is able to correspond to a plurality of concrete instances this therefore proves that it itself is not specified with a particular position, place, quality & quantity, and is consequently not sensible in character but intelligible; and since the intellect or the apprehending soul نفس مدرکہ recognizes the existence of this intelligible it becomes evident that existence is not just sensible but intelligible as well; in other words in order for a thing to exist it is by no means necessary for it to be specified with material properties.